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“WHAT DO I DO ABOUT THIS WORD,
‘UNAVOIDABLE’?”: RESOLVING TEXTUAL
AMBIGUITY IN THE NATIONAL
CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT
Jason LaFond*†
Introduction
The quote in the title of this Essay comes from Justice Breyer, expressing his frustration with the language of section 22(b)(1) of the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Justice Breyer made this comment during the
1
October 12, 2010, oral argument in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., a case about
the availability of state tort claims based on vaccine design defects. The
question before the Court was whether that section expressly preempts such
claims against vaccine manufacturers “if the injury or death resulted from
side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly
2
prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.” The
answer depends on whether, as the Supreme Court of Georgia held, a court
must make a case-by-case determination whether a side effect was “un3
avoidable” before a claim is preempted, or whether, as the Third Circuit
held, Congress made a categorical determination that all side effects occurring despite proper preparation and labeling are “unavoidable,” and that
claims deriving from them are therefore preempted, eliminating all such
4
design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers.
Every court that has confronted this issue has found the language drafted
by Congress to be, as Justice Ginsburg said, “certainly, to say the least,
confusing.” This Essay seeks to clear up some of that confusion, arguing
that the language of § 22(b)(1), when closely analyzed, calls for the
categorical approach adopted by the Third Circuit. Rather than anticipating
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1. Oral Argument at p. 46, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-152, available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-152.pdf
2.

42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1).

3.

Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 140 (Ga. 2008).

4. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 245–46 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1734 (March 8, 2010).
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a case-by-case analysis of unavoidability, the statute employs the word
“unavoidable” as a term of art that establishes premises that when satisfied
make a vaccine injury inherently “unavoidable.” This Essay argues Congress
has demonstrated that it is willing to adopt this kind of categorical approach
regarding the issue of unavoidability in other statutes. This Essay further
argues that the text of § 22(b)(1), although muddled, supports a categorical
approach, because it defines the premises that must be true in order for the
conclusion of unavoidability to be reached.
I. The Problem
The Act created a National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program to
handle claims against manufacturers for vaccine-related injuries. This program involves a no-fault scheme where claimants seek compensation from a
“vaccine court.” If the claimant rejects the judgment of the vaccine court,
she may pursue certain limited claims in state or federal court. The primary
limit on such tort claims is that a claimant may not pursue a tort claim “if
the injury or death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even
though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper
directions and warnings.” But what makes a side effect unavoidable? Looming in the background of this inquiry are thousands of potential lawsuits by
parents of children with autism. These parents blame childhood vaccines for
causing the disorder, but so far they have been turned away by the vaccine
court because the court found the evidence linking vaccines to autism legal5
ly insufficient to establish causation.
At the outset, it certainly seems that the statute’s failure to define the
word “unavoidable” is an invitation for case-by-case analysis. The conclusion that an event is unavoidable can never be proven absolutely and is more
properly labeled a judgment call. Judgment calls lend themselves very well
to the close examination of circumstance. In the absence of a statutory definition, courts must examine the facts and circumstances of each case and
consider the sum of nondecisive reasons in favor of an ad hoc conclusion as
to whether a death was “unavoidable.” A court’s role is more limited, however, if the statute lists the premises that must be true in order to reach the
conclusion at issue; in such a case, the court only determines whether those
conditions are satisfied.
The inquiry then becomes whether § 22(b)(1) adopted such a categorical
approach to the question of unavoidability. The Bruesewitz family argued
before the Court that a categorical interpretation would “render[] the entire
concept of unavoidability surplusage” because Congress could have left out
the term and just said that claims based on design defects were preempted if
the vaccine was properly manufactured and contained proper warnings.
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Alito responded that this reading would in
turn render the words following “unavoidable”—”even though the vaccine
was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings”—mere surplusage. But both the word “unavoidable” and the words
following it do serve a purpose: “unavoidable” is a term of art in tort law for
5. See, e.g., Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., No. 98-916V, 2009 WL 331968
(Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009), aff’d, 89 Fed. Cl. 158 (2009), aff’d, 617 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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damages that are noncompensable. When it passed the Act, Congress employed this term of art to define which claims could not be brought outside
of the vaccine court—i.e., those that were preempted. Furthermore, as discussed below, the words following “unavoidable” are premises that establish
when an injury will be categorized as unavoidable.
The court below in Bruesewitz did little to help the resolution of this
problem when it unnecessarily complicated the issue. Rather than taking the
language of the statute head-on, the Third Circuit held that the term “unavoidable” is not defined anywhere in the Act, and instead justified its
conclusion that § 22(b)(1) is a categorical exclusion by referencing the Act’s
structure, purpose, and legislative history. The Act’s structure and purpose
are indeterminate, however, as noted in oral argument: the Act can be seen
as designed to compensate those injured by vaccines, whose claims were
largely denied in courts prior to the Act; and it can also be viewed as enacting a policy choice to protect manufacturers from large, uncertain tort
liability, thereby keeping prices low and keeping manufacturers in the market. The legislative history is also of little guidance. One committee report
7
suggests a categorical approach, while another suggests a case-by-case ap8
proach. Such conflicting aids to interpretation are in fact no aid at all.
Fortunately, logic and context allow a textual analysis of § 22(b)(1) to
“stand[] on its own, without need of (or indeed any assistance from)” these
9
interpretive devices. Congress set the conditions that must be true · proper
preparation, warnings, and directions—in order to reach the conclusion of
unavoidability. This categorical proposition precludes a case-by-case approach.
II. The Logic of Unavoidability
“Unavoidable” describes an absolute state. This absolute state is a legal
conclusion that can only be reached through logical reasoning. Three contrasting types of reasoning could lead to a conclusion of unavoidability. The
first—reasoning from observation—is precluded because unavoidability,
being in the form of a negative, requires an inordinate amount of observation before one can even come close to reaching an acceptable level of
probable accuracy. This is what Kathleen Sullivan, attorney for Wyeth, described in oral argument as “shadowboxing against an infinite number of
theories about how there could have been a safer vaccine.” Anyone who has
been asked to prove a negative understands this difficulty.
Alternatively, the conclusion of unavoidability could be reached the
same way that the conclusion of liability is reached: a court could look at
facts, and then decide based on some legal standard whether some occurrence was unavoidable. This is classic case-by-case analysis; the approach
which the Bruesewitz family asked the Court to adopt. A final way to reach
this conclusion is to construct premises that, when true, definitionally yield
6.

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. k (1965).

7.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 26 (1986).

8.

H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, pt. 1, at 691 (1987).

9. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the conclusion. This creates a shortcut around the time consuming, case-bycase analysis: legislators make the judgment that if a, b, and c are true, conclusion x necessarily follows. Whether that proposition is accurate in the
absolute sense is of no consequence. It is accurate in the legal sense—
because it passed both houses of Congress, was signed by the president, and
is not unconstitutional. This truth in the legal sense is what matters. A court
need only determine if the premises are true. This is the classic categorical
approach—the approach sought by Wyeth, and the approach Congress
adopted in § 22(b)(1): all events (injuries from side effects) that result from
administration of any vaccine and satisfies the premises of the Act (proper
preparation, proper directions, and proper warnings) are categorically “unavoidable.”
III. Congress Is Comfortable Defining the Term “Unavoidable”
Although finding that something is unavoidable may seem like a judgment call naturally made by courts, Congress and agencies are comfortable
making the categorical determination that when certain premises are true,
events will be categorized as “unavoidable.” For example, an animal cruelty
statute called the “28-hour law,” which was drafted in a similarly poor and
redundant fashion, allowed animals in transport to be confined for more than
28 hours only if off-loading was “prevented by storm or by other accidental
or unavoidable causes which cannot be anticipated or avoided by the exer10
cise of due diligence and foresight.” Courts interpreting this language have
held that when a transporter meets the specified conditions that follow the
term “unavoidable,” he is within the defined universe of “unavoidable” and
11
therefore exempt from the requirement. In other words, when the premises
(exercise of due diligence and foresight) are true, the conclusion (excess
confinement was unavoidable) follows. When the premises are not true, the
12
conclusion does not follow. The statute called for and the courts applied a
categorical approach. There was no need for case-by-case analysis, and none
was used. This situation is similar to the proper analysis of “unavoidable”
under the Vaccine Act: when facts establish that a vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings (like
establishing due diligence under the 28-hour law), there is no further inquiry
needed as to whether the resulting outcome was unavoidable.
Agencies, using power delegated from Congress, also define premises
that lead to the conclusion that an event is “unavoidable.” One patent statute,
for example, says, “[t]he Director may accept the payment of any maintenance fee . . . at any time after the six-month grace period if the delay is
13
shown to the satisfaction of the Director to have been unavoidable.” The
regulation interpreting this statute requires a patentee to show “that the delay was unavoidable since reasonable care was taken to ensure that the
10. Pub. L. No. 59-340, 34 Stat. 607–08 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 80502) (emphasis added).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Boston & Maine R.R., 99 F.2d 635, 637 (1st Cir. 1938); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. United States, 194 F. 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1912).
12.

See Boston & Maine R.R., 117 F.2d at 427.

13.

35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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maintenance fee would be paid timely. . . .” This regulation has been applied in a categorical fashion by courts: if the premise (reasonable care
taken) is true, the conclusion (delay was unavoidable) will follow, and vice
versa. In Ray v. Lehman, for example, the court noted, “the standard is unavoidable delay. . . . [I]n order to satisfy this standard, one must show that
15
he exercised the due care of a reasonably prudent person.” Thus, in applying the phrase “unavoidable since reasonable care was taken,” the court only
looks to see whether the premise is true. There are many other examples like
this of agencies defining the premises that must be true for the conclusion of
16
unavoidability to be reached.
IV. “Even Though” Has a Special Meaning
when Used with “Unavoidable”
The primary difficulty of a textual analysis in this case arises because of
the use of “even though” in § 22(b)(1). “Even though” is a subordinating
conjunction. A subordinating conjunction joins a subordinate clause to a
main clause and is used to indicate the relationship between the two clauses.
Different subordinating conjunctions show different relationships. For example, they can be used to show cause or manner, indicate concession, fix a
17
time, etc. In § 22(b)(1), as noted by the Third Circuit in Bruesewitz, “even
though” connects the main clause, “side effects that were unavoidable”—
which, were it not for the second clause, could stand alone as a complete
thought—to the subordinate clause, “the vaccine was properly prepared and
was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.” As discussed above,
when congressional drafters choose a categorical approach, they do so by
constructing premises that when true yield the conclusion: finding the truth
of the premises leads to acceptance of the conclusion. Thus, for § 22(b)(1)
to be categorical, one must show that “even though” connects the conclusion
(in the main clause) to the premises (in the subordinate clause) in a relationship of causation; in other words, proper preparation, directions, and
warnings leads to the conclusion that the side effect was unavoidable.
The problem is that “even though” is not usually used as a subordinating
conjunction to show cause. The most appropriate subordinating conjunc18
tions to show cause are words like “because,” “as,” and “since,” as was the
case with the patent regulation discussed above (“unavoidable since”). The
subordinating conjunction “even though,” on the other hand, is most properly used to indicate a relationship of concession between a main and a
subordinate clause: the subordinate clause acknowledges something as true
that makes the main clause appear to be an unexpected result. For example,
the conjunction often appears in a definition that is conceded to be counterintuitive: “A veteran shall be considered as living with a spouse, even

14.

37 C.F.R. § 1.378(b)(3) (2010) (emphasis added).

15.

55 F.3d 606, 609 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

16.

See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 70.20; 7 C.F.R. § 457.167(11)(a); 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(a)(2).

17.

See Margaret Shertzer, The Elements of Grammar 46 (2001).

18.

Id.
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though they reside apart. . . .” The conjunction also often appears where
there is a fact that is conceded to be relevant but should nonetheless be ignored: “Amounts received in respect of the services of a child shall be
included in his gross income and not in the gross income of the parent, even
20
though such amounts are not received by the child.” Thus, the choice of the
conjunction “even though” in § 22(b)(1) must be explained if a textual argument for a categorical approach is to be convincing.
This strange use of “even though” can be explained, however, and it
rests on the special nature of unavoidability. The premises put forward for a
conclusion of unavoidability usually involve required precautions and an
undesired event. When the premises are true—the required precautions have
been taken—and the undesired event still occurs, the conclusion of unavoidability follows. Thus, the relationship between the premises and the
conclusion of unavoidability is in the form of a concession: the required
precautions have been taken and nonetheless the event occurs. The precautions taken make the occurrence of the undesired event a surprise; it is
because the occurrence of the event, in the face of precautions, is a surprise
that the label “unavoidable” is used in the first place. This inherent concession in reaching the conclusion that an event was “unavoidable” (the
surprise that the undesired event occurred after precautions had been taken)
explains the usage of “even though,” a concessionary subordinating conjunction, in § 22(b)(1). An injury or death from a vaccine side effect
occurring after proper preparation, directions, and warnings is a surprise,
and it is because such injury or death is not expected that the injury or death
is categorically labeled “unavoidable.”
This explanation is confirmed by other instances where “even though”
and “unavoidable” are juxtaposed. For example, under fish and wildlife regulations, a permit for programmatic (i.e., ongoing) eagle take (i.e.,
disturbance) will be granted when “the take is unavoidable even though ad21
vanced conservation practices are being implemented.” While no court has
yet interpreted this regulation, the Department of the Interior has explained,
in describing this rule, that the “even though” conjunction was used to show
that the truth of the premises in the subordinating clause (“advanced conservation practices are being implemented”) causes the conclusion in the main
clause (“take is unavoidable”), and hence a permit may be issued. The Department interpreted the statute allowing programmatic permits to be issued
when “take is unavoidable even though advanced conservation practices are
being implemented” to mean “[w]e can issue programmatic permits . . .
22
based on implementation of ‘advanced conservation practices.’ ” Thus, the
implementation of “advanced conservation practices” causes the take to fall
under the umbrella of “unavoidable.” The “even though” language was used
to show that the truth of the premises causes the conclusion, just as was
done in § 22(b)(1).

19.

38 U.S.C. § 1521(h)(2) (emphasis added).

20.

26 U.S.C. § 73(a) (emphasis added).

21.

50 C.F.R. § 22.26(a)(2) (2010) (emphasis added).

22.

74 Fed. Reg. 46,841 (2009).
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This usage of “even though” can also be found in the context of motor
vehicle tort law. Many states label a motor vehicle accident “unavoidable” if
it occurs even though ordinary care was used or no one was at fault. That is,
the truth of the premise (ordinary care was used) causes the conclusion (the
accident was unavoidable). In Batts v. Capps, for example, the Virginia
Supreme Court analyzed a jury instruction defining the unavoidable
accident doctrine: “the law recognizes that a collision between vehicles may
be unavoidable even though the drivers are lawfully, properly and without
23
negligence operating the same.” It is the concession that due care was used
(premise true), and still the accident happened, that causes the conclusion
(accident unavoidable). In describing the law under which the above jury
instruction was formulated, the court in Batts confirmed the concessionary
nature of the analysis and the causative nature of “even though”: “Where
there is a reasonable theory of the evidence under which the parties involved
may be held to have exercised due care notwithstanding that the accident
occurred, an unavoidable accident instruction is proper and should be
24
submitted to the jury.”
Conclusion
The distinction between a categorical and case-by-case approach turns
on the freedom given to courts. If a conclusion in the form of an ambiguous
term such as “unavoidable” is left undefined, then it is up to courts to reason
to conclusion by the gathering and aggregating of facts on a case-by-case
basis. On the other hand, when Congress has outlined an approach by defining premises that, if true, will necessarily lead to the conclusion, courts are
left only to apply that categorical proposition: they must determine if the
premises are true; if they are, the conclusion follows. Congress has shown
itself willing to set the premises of unavoidability and other instances of the
phrase “unavoidable even though” show that it is used to set such premises.
Once the somewhat muddled language of § 22(b)(1) is placed in this proper
context, we can see that it creates just such a categorical proposition. When
the premises defined by Congress are true—proper preparation, directions,
and warnings—the conclusion must therefore follow—the side effect is unavoidable.

23.

191 S.E.2d 227, 228 (Va. 1972) (emphasis added).

24.

Id.; see also Sears v. Frost’s Administrator, 279 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Ky. 1955).

